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IV,
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The

court

has

jurisdiction

to

hear

this

appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2(3) (j) and Rule 4A of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
V.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Trial Court follow the mandate of John

Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah
1987)?
2.

Did the Trial Court err in allowing Manti, on the

day of trial and over the objection of Call, to amend its answer
by alleging

the unpled

affirmative

defense

of mitigation of

damages?
3.
revoking

a

Did the Trial Court
trial

continuance

to

err

in granting

allow

Call

to

and then

address

and

prepare for Call's mitigation of damages defense?
4.

Did the Trial Court commit reversible error when

it failed to submit Call's jury instructions telling the jury
how to calculate lost profits?
5.
inject

Did

irrelevant

proceeding?

Those

the Trial Court err
and

prejudicial

issues

in allowing Manti to
issues

in

include, but are not
1

the

trial

limited to,

whether the judgment would be paid out of the jurors pockets as
taxpayers,

and

whether

Call

should

he

paid

for

work

not

performed?
6.

Did the Trial Court err in denying Call's motion

for a directed verdict and in denying Call's motion for judgment
notwithstanding
amend

the

the verdict, or in the alternative, motion to

judgment, or

in the

alternative, motion

for a

new

trial?
7.

Did the Trial Court err in not taxing as costs

against Manti, the expert witness fees incurred by Call?
VI.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
The
ordinances,

relevant

rules

and

constitutional

regulations

are

provisions,
attached

addendum in the addendum to Appellant's Brief.

statutes,

in plaintiff's

They are:

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8; Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15;
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50; Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59;
and Article I Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Sixth
Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County awarding the
2

appellant John Call Engineering, Inc. ("Call") $13,440 plus prejudgment

interest

and costs

against the respondent Manti City

Corp. ("Manti") and a subsequent order denying Call's motion for
judgment notwithstanding verdict, or in the alternative, motion
to amend the judgment, or in the alternative, motion for a new
trial.
VIII.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

John Call Engineering, sued Manti City for breach

of an engineering services contract.

The contract required Manti

City to compensate Call according to the contract's schedule of
rates.

(R. 1, 12, plaintiff's exhibit 1.)
2.

After

a

non-jury

judgment in favor of Manti.

trial,

Judge

Tibbs

entered

a

Call appealed. (R. 182, 183, 185,

186. )
3.
decision

The

Utah

and instructed

Supreme

Court

reversed

him to determine

enter judgment in favor of Call.

Judge

Tibbs'

[Call's] damages and

John Call Engineering, Inc. v.

Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Utah 1987).
4.
discovery.

Thereafter,

the

parties

conducted

additional

(R. 123.)
5.

A second trial, this time before a jury, was held.

(R. 247-261.)
3

6.

Call made a Motion in Limine to limit or exclude

evidence and argument to the following irrelevant and prejudicial issues:
a)

Whether Call should be paid for work not performed,

b)

Whether the

judgment would be paid out of juror

and/or taxpayer's pockets.
c)

Whether Call mitigated his damages.

(R. 235-246.)
7.
the

jury was

alleging
ages.

The Court denied the Motion in Limine and after
impaneled, allowed Manti

the unpled

affirmative

8.

trial.

its answer by

defense of mitigation of dam-

(Transcript of Proceedings, January 12 & 13, 1989, p. 67-

73, hereafter "Tr. p.

would

to amend

The

prejudice

.")

Court

Call,

understood

and

offered

the
Call

last
a

minute

amendment

continuance

of

the

(Tr. p. 73.)
9.

Manti r s

counsel

informed

objection to continuing the trial.
10.

the

Court

it

had

no

(Tr. p. 75.)

However, when Call accepted

the continuance

the

Court changed its mind and revoked the continuance. (Tr. p. 7 576.)
11.

Thereafter,

the

Court

allowed

argument

on

mitigation

of

damages,

(Tr.

p.

182)

and

approved

a

jury

instruction on mitigation of damages, (Jury Instruction No. 21.)
12.
following

Over

the

objection

of

Call's

irrelevant and prejudicial arguments

counsel,

the

and issues were

allowed to go to the jury:
a)

The contract was in dispute (Tr. p. 79-81).

The

Utah Supreme Court in Call, supra, had previously
construed the contract in favor of Call.

b)

Call

prepared a sewer

able

system

which

was not

accept-

to the State Board of Health. (Tr. p. 81).

c)

Call was paid for everything he did. (Tr. p. 81).

d)

Call was not allowed to proceed without written
authorization from Manti City. (Tr. p. 210-211).
The Utah Supreme Court in Call, supra, held the
contract's

authorization

to

proceed

provisions

did not excuse Manti's failure to pay Call.
e)

That

taxpayer's would have to pay any judgment.

(Tr. p. 318).
13.
Call

At

established

trial, Call
his

lost

sought

profits

to recover
by

expert

lost profits.
opinion,

past

financial records, the opinion of the business owner, records of
similar businesses

and

testimony

of a similar business owner.

(Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 32-38, 42; Tr. p. 88-301.)

14.

Defendant put on no case whatsoever, except for a

few perfunctory questions to, David Thurgood, the engineer hired
by Manti when Manti breached Call's contract. Call, supra; (Tr.
p. 315, 316.)
15.

The

uncontradicted

and

unimpeached

evidence at

trial showed that John Call Engineering, Inc. was entitled to
damages ranging from $191,998 for a high to $57,990 as set forth
below.
Evidence

Amount of damages

John Call Contract, Testimony
of John Call and Expert Testimony
of Randy Peterson

$191,998.00

OR
The Expert testimony of Chuck
Peterson, of Frank Stuart & Associates
OR
Gross Receipts as Determined by Randy
Peterson multiplied by the Average Profit
Margin Taken from Call's Financial Records
from 1981 through 1986

$136,334 . 00

$ 70,278.00

OR
Gross Receipts called for by the Call
Contract multiplied by Thurgood's estimated
Profit Margin
16.

$ 57,990.00

At the close of plaintiff's case, the plaintiff

moved the Court for a directed verdict in the sum of not less
than

$56,377.

The

Court

denied
6

plaintiff's

motion

without

prejudice but on the record, expressed
that Call had put on
records

and expert

its concern to counsel

a thorough case consisting

testimony

of

and evidence of similar

financial
business

owners while Manti put on no evidence at all. (Tr. p. 316.)
17.

The Court failed to present Call's proposed jury

verdict form and instructions telling the jury how to calculate
lost

profits.

(Tr.

p.

303,

312;

Call's

proposed

Jury

Instruction Nos. 8, 12 and 12 amended.)
18.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Call for

$13,440. (R. 262.)
19.

Call filed timely motions under Rule 50 and 59 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, or in the alternative, motion to amend the judgment,
or in the alternative, motion for a new trial. (R. 276-294.)
20.

The Trial Court denied Call's motions and denied

Call's request for expert witness fee costs.
21.

Call appealed.

(R. 335-336.)

(R. 339-340.)

IX.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I - THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
ALLOWED THE DEFENDANT TO AMEND ITS ANSWER AND ALLEGE
THE UNPLED MITIGATION OF DAMAGES AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Court allowed Manti city to amend
allege

the

unpled

mitigation

of
7

damages

its answer to

affirmative

defense.

The amendment occurred nearly 6 years after the litigation commenced and after the jury was impanelled•
The

amendment

prejudiced

Call

because

Call

was

not

given time to prepare the issue for trial*
Further, the amendment was contrary to the Utah Supreme
Court's

ruling

in

John

Call

Engineering,

Inc. v.

Manti

City

Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (1987).
Finally, by waiting until trial to move to amend, Manti
waived any mitigation of damages issue.
POINT II -

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE MANDATE OF
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

The Utah Supreme Court in John Call Engineering, Inc.
v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d
lower court

1205

(Utah

1987) instructed the

to determine Call's damages and enter

judgment in

favor of Call.
The trial court did not do that.
court, over Call's objections, allowed

Instead the trial

irrelevant and prejudi-

cial arguments and issues into the trial such as:
1)

Whether the contract was in dispute;

2)

Whether Call should be paid for something he had
not done; and

3)

Whether Call should have mitigated his damages.

8

POINT III

-

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL

Allowing Manti to amend its answer at trial prejudiced
Call.

The trial court knew Call was prejudiced and offered a

continuance.

Manti agreed to the continuance.

But, when Call

accepted the continuance, the court changed its mind.

The trial

court's abuse of discretion requires a new trial.
POINT IV

-

THE COURT FAILED TO GIVE CALL'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS TELLING THE JURY HOW TO CALCULATE
CALL'S LOST PROFITS

The Court has a duty to tell the jury how to measure
or calculate Call's damages.

Call submitted jury instructions

and a verdict form to assist the jury in determining Call's lost
profits.
The trial court refused the instructions and the verdict form.

Further, the trial court totally failed to instruct

the jury on how to determine Call's damages.

The jury was unin-

formed and allowed to use its imagination.
POINT V - THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF
CALL FOR AT LEAST $56,000 OR AWARDED A NEW TRIAL
Call established his lost profits by: 1) testimony of
the business owner; 2) financial records; 3) expert testimony;
4) testimony of a similar business owner, and 5) records of a
similar business owner.
Manti's case consisted of a few questions to one of
9

Call's witnessesminimal.

The court acknowledged that Manti's case was

The uncontradicted

evidence shows that Call was en-

titled to a judgment of at least $56,377.
POINT VI

-

THE COURT ALLOWED MANTI TO PRESENT IRRELEVANT AND
PREJUDICIAL ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY

Over the objection of Call's counsel, the trial court
allowed issues previously ruled upon by the Utah Supreme Court.
The

issues

were

prejudicial

and

confusing

to

the

jury.

In

addition, the trial court informed Manti that the court would
sustain objections to certain types of arguments.

Nevertheless,

Manti caused the following prejudicial arguments and issues to be
conveyed to the jury:
1)

The contract was in dispute.
Supreme

Court

ruled

In fact, the Utah

that

the

paid

twice

only

issue

was

work

not

damages.
2)

Call

should

not

be

for

performed.
3)

Call could
zation.

not proceed without written authori-

Contrary to Manti's argument, the Utah

Supreme Court had ruled the written authorization
clause of the contract was not an excuse for not
paying Call.
4)

The verdict would come out of taxpayers pockets.
10

Each of the foregoing arguments either was contrary to
the Supreme Court's ruling and/or prejudicial to Call.

Each

requires a new trial,
POINT VII

-

CALL SHOULD

BE AWARDED

HIS EXPERT WITNESS FEE

COSTS
Because establishing lost profits in a contract case
is a complex process, Call needed expert testimony.
testimony was expensive.

That expert

Previously, the Utah Supreme Court has

allowed costs for expert testimony taken by deposition.

It makes

no sense to allow costs for expert deposition testimony but not
allow costs for expert trial testimony.
X.
ARGUMENT
POINT I - THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
ALLOWED THE DEFENDANT TO AMEND ITS ANSWER AND ALLEGE
THE UNPLED MITIGATION OF DAMAGES AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
A. Factual Background
Call's complaint was filed on March 17, 1983.
answer was filed on April 7, 1983.
the mitigation

of damages

Manti's

The answer did not contain

affirmative defense.

(R.

19-20.)

Mitigation of damages was not an issue in the first trial nor in
discovery proceedings both before and after the first trial.

Up

to the date of the second trial, Manti never sought an order
allowing it to amend its answer.
11

In summary, during the nearly six year period from the
time Manti filed its answer up to the date of trial, Manti never
sought nor obtained an order allowing it to amend its answer to
plead mitigation of damages as an affirmative defense.
The Court, over Call's objections, denied plaintiff's
Motion in Limine and granted defendant's motion to amend its
answer by alleging the mitigation of damages affirmative defense.
However,

realizing

that

Call

was

prejudiced

by

the

Court's

ruling, the Court offered Call a continuance.
I'm going to grant the motion. . .Now if you
want a continuance of the case and you feel
that's proper, Counsel, I'll grant you a
continuance.
(Tr. p. 73.)
Manti's

attorney

also

realizing

that

Call

prejudiced had no objection to the trial being continued.
p.75).

was
(Tr.

However, when Call's counsel explained that neither he

nor Call were prepared to try the mitigation of defense issue and
accepted the Court's continuance, the Court changed its mind.
I'm changing my thing. We are going forward
and we're going to allow it [the amended
answer]. . . .it's my responsibility to go
forward in the interest of judicial economy.
(Tr. p. 75-76.)
Thereafter, Manti was allowed to present the mitigation
of damages issue to the jury.
12

Now the city's position is that once he
[Call] was informed — this would be the
evidence that will be introduced — once he
was informed that he was no longer on the
job then he had knowledge of what the situation was and was put in a position where he
could take various corrective action to
minimize the loss he would sustain by not
doing this job, if any.
(Manti's counsel's opening statement tr. p. 83.)
The Court then allowed evidence on the mitigation of
damages

issue

and

followed

up

with

the

following

jury

instruction.
John Call upon his first notice of breach of
contract on March 23, 1982 had a duty to
mitigate any damage he may have sustained.
This action requires a course of conduct on
his part to cut his losses.
(Jury Instruction No. 21.)
Bo Legal Analysis
After the first trial, the Utah Supreme Court limited
the trial issue to one, the amount of Call's damages.

John Call

Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp. 743 P.2d 1205, 1210 (1987).
This case is reversed and remanded to the
trial court with instructions to determine
plaintiff's damages and enter judgment in
favor of Call.
Call, at 1210.
The

Supreme

Court

instructed

the

Trial

Court

to

determine Call's damages, not to determine whether Call should
13

have mitigated his damages.

But the trial court, disregarded the

instructions of the Utah Supreme Court,
The trial court's action was not only contrary to the
Utah Supreme Court's

ruling but also contrary to well

settled

case law,
U.R.C.P.
answer

"any

defense,"

8 requires

matter

the

constituting

party
an

to

set

avoidance

forth
or

in

his

affirmative

Mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense, e.g.

Pratt v. Board of Education 564 P.2d

294 (Utah 1977).

When a

defendant fails to plead an affirmative defense, he waives the
affirmative defense.

Mabey v. Kay Peterson Construction Co., 682

P.2d 287 (Utah 1984).
In Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d
Supreme

Court

mitigation

of

specifically
damages

as

held
an

that

opinion.

counsel

(Tr. p. 71.)

made

the

(Utah

the

affirmative

mitigation of damages issue at trial.
Call's

1352

1986) the Utah

failure

defense,

to

plead

waives

any

Gill, at 1357.
Court

aware

of

the

Gill

However, the trial court disregarded Gill

and disregarded

the specific

instructions

imposed

by the Utah

Supreme Court.

Instead, the court encouaraged and allowed Manti

to amend its answer after the jury had been impanelled.
A party's pleadings may be amended only in the sound
discretion of the Trial Court.
14

Wasechea v. Terra,

Inc., 528

P.2d

802

(Utah

1974).

However,

if

the

Court

abuses

that

discretion, the decision will be reversed Gillman v. Hansen, 26
Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971); Lloyd f s Unlimited v. Nature's
Way Markets, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 (Utah App. 1988).

It is an abuse

of discretion to allow an amendment which prejudices the other
party.

Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth 664 P.2d 445 (Utah 1983).
Because

almost

last

always prejudice

minute

271,

Inc. v. Nephi

470 P.2d

1983);

asserting

the other party, the courts

refuse to grant eve of trial
Hatcheries,

amendments

amendments.

Processing

new

routinely

See, Hein's

Plant,

issues

Turkey

Inc., 24 Utah 2d

257 (1974); Girard v.Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah

Staker v. Huntington/Cleveland

Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d

188 (Utah 1987).
C. Call was Prejudiced
In
ways:

this

case, Call

was

prejudiced

in the

following

First, pursuant to the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court,

Call was entitled to have as the sole trial issue, the measure of
damages sustained by Call.
from Call.

The trial court took that right away

Second, Call was prejudiced

because the amendment

inserted a new issue into the proceedings in which Call was not
prepared to try.
Call's counsel explained that Call was prejudiced.
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I don't know what his theory is your honor
and it hasn't been an issue that's gone
through discovery. . ,1 haven't got the
foggiest idea what questions he's going to
ask my witness. And I would have prepared
for it before coming to trial.
(Tr. p. 72.)
The Court knew that Call was prejudiced.
Counsel, I'll grant you a continuance.
I
don't want to, but I will, if you feel that
you could reach and bring some more evidence
in that would help you in this.
(Tr. p. 73.)
Manti's counsel also knew that Call had been prejudiced
and agreed to the continuance.
I wouldn't
tinuance.

have

any

objection

to

a con-

(Tr. p. 75.)
However, despite the fact that Call was prejudiced and
the

Court

knew

Call

was

prejudiced,

the

Court

unilaterally

revoked its offer to continue the trial, allowed the amendments,
and forced the trial to begin, all of which prejudiced Call.
D.

Conclusion
The Utah Supreme Court, in the first appeal determined

that

the

damages.

sole

issue

to be tried was

the measure of Call's

The trial court disregarded the ruling of the Utah

Supreme Court.

Further, the trial court disregarded the reported
16

decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and Court of Appeals and
allowed the amendment inserting new issues into the trial.
record shows that Call was prejudiced.

The

For these reasons, the

Court should reverse the judgment entered in the lower Court and
order a new trial.
POINT IT

-

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE MANDATE OF
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

A.

Factual Background
In this case, the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court

was simple.
This case is reversed and remanded to the
trial court with instructions to determine
plaintiff's damages and enter judgment in
favor of Call.
Call, at 1210.
The
considered
court.

appellate

Court's

by the appellate Court

decision

on

all

issues

is binding upon the trial

Corbett v. Fitzgerald, 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985).

When a

judgment is reversed and remanded with specific instructions, the
lower court is bound to follow the instructions and the case is
treated

as

if

a trial

had

not

been

held.

Hidden Meadows

Development Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979).
No new defenses existing at the date of the appellate
Court's decision may be heard.
§992 at 419 (1962).

5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error

The decision of the appellate Court is the
17

law of the case-

Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 113

Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153 (1948).
In this case, the Court directly violated the mandate
of the Utah Supreme Court,

Rather than simply determining Call's

damages, the Court allowed the jury to also determine whether
Call should have mitigated his damages.

The failure of the trial

Court, to follow the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court, requires
this Appellate Court, to either enter a judgment consistent with
the Utah Supreme Court's mandate or order a new trial.
POINT III

-

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONTINUE THE CASE.

A. Factual Background
After

the trial court

erroneously ruled that Manti

could amend its answer almost six years after commencement of
the litigation and immediately after the jury was impanelled,
the Court offered plaintiff a continuance,,
I'm going to grant the motion. . .if you
want a continuance of the case and you feel
that's proper, Counsel, I'll grant you a
continuance.
(Tr. p. 73.)
Manti's counsel agreed that a continuance was warranted
by Manti's amendment.
We wouldn't
continuance.

have

any

(Tr. p. 75.)
18

objection

to

a

When Call accepted the continuance, because he was not
prepared to try the mitigation of damages issue, the trial judge
changed his mind.
I'm changing my thing. We are going forward
and we're going to allow it. . .it's my
responsibility to go forward in the interest
of judicial economy.
(Tr. p. 75-76.)
As set

forth

in Point

I above, the

jury was then

allowed to consider the issue of mitigation of damages.
B. Legal Analysis
Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes
a continuance or postponement "upon good cause shown."

The good

cause in this case was the Court allowing the new mitigation of
damages

issue

to

be

injected

into

the

trial

proceedings.

Frequently, when courts allow a party to amend its pleading, the
court

will

continue

or

postpone

prejudice to the other party.

the

trial

to minimize

the

See e.g., Commercial Credit Corp,

v. Harris, 510 P.2d 1322 (Kan. 1973); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 545
P.2d 657 (Mont. 1976);
District Court

Eagle River Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v.

in and for Eagle County, 647 P.2d

660 (Colo.

1982) .
Whether a trial should be continued, is within the
sound discretion of the trial court.
19

Christenson v. Jewkes, 761

P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988).

The decision will be reversed when there

is an abuse of discretion,
373 P.2d 375 (1967).
is prejudiced.

Bairas v. Johnson/ 13 Utah 2d 269,

An abuse of discretion occurs when a party

Malasarte v. Coleman, 393 P.2d 902 (Alaska 1964).

In Malasarte, the Trial Court, permitted the plaintiff
to amend

its breach of contract complaint to add a claim

negligence after the trial commenced.
continuance.

for

The defendant moved for a

The continuance was denied.

On appeal, the Court

ruled that by allowing a new issue to be injected into the trial,
the

defendant

Court's

was

failure

prejudiced

requiring

a

continuance.

to grant the continuance was

reversible

The
error

requiring a new trial Malasarte v. Coleman, 393 P. 2d 902, 907
(Alaska 1964) .
Malasarte,

is

four

square

with

the

present

action.

Both cases involve a breach of contract case.

After the trial

commenced,

both parties

the

Court, in both

cases, allowed

amend and create new trial issues.
for

a trial

continuance

to

The responding parties moved

to prepare

for the new

issues.

The

denial of the motions for a continuance prejudiced the responding
parties.

(See, Point I, above.)

Denial of the continuance was

reversible error and requires a new trial.
C.

Malasarte, supra.

Conclusion
The trial court prejudiced Call when it allowed Manti
20

to amend its answer.

The remedy to lessen the prejudice caused

by an amendment, is to postpone the trial.
court's offer and requested a continuance.

Call accepted the
The Court's denial

of the requested continuance, prejudiced Call and requires a new
trial.
POINT IV

-

THE COURT FAILED TO GIVE CALL'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS TELLING THE JURY HOW TO CALCULATE
CALL'S LOST PROFITS

A, Factual Background
From day one of this litigation, the issue was the
amount of Call's lost profit as a result of Manti's breach of
the engineering services contract.

Furthermore, the trial judge

knew that the only issue to be tried was the calculation of lost
profits.
He's [Call] entitled to his benefit of his
bargain, in my opinion. The benefit of the
bargain is his profit on the deal and that's
it.
What he would receive, less his
expenses, less the profit, that's what he's
entitled to.
(Tr. p. 71.)
Call

requested

the

following

instructions.

Jury

Instruction No. 8 informed the jury of the rates Manti agreed to
pay Call.
Jury Instruction No. 8:
You are instructed that the contract entered into
between the plaintiff John Call Engineering, Inc., and defendant
21

Manti City, required Manti City to pay for engineering services
at the following rates:
Hourly Rates
48.00
39.00
33.50
22.50
24.00
20.00
14.00
47.00
53.50
64.50
13.00

Principal
Project Manager
Project Engineer
Design Draftsman
Senior Draftsman
Draftsman
Clerical
Two Man Survey Party
Three Man Survey Party
Four Man Survey Party
Computer Time

In addition, Manti was to pay the plaintiff a mileage
allowance as follows.
Automobiles

.33/mile

Trucks

.43/mile
Jury Instruction No. 12 and Amended Jury Instruction

No. 12 told the jury how lost profits are calculated.
Jury Instruction No. 12;
John Call
formula:

In deciding the amount of damages; you are to award
Engineering, Inc., you are to use the following
First, determine the amount of money John
Call Engineering would have received if Manti
had allowed Call Engineering to fully perform
the engineer service contract.
Next, subtract the expenses that Call
Engineering saved by not having to perform
the contract.
In other words, determine
what Call's costs to complete the contract
would have been. In determining the expenses Call Engineering saved, you do not
subtract fixed overhead expenses that did
not decrease when Call was prevented from
completing the contract.
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The answer is the lost profits
that are to be awarded to Call.

or damages

Amended Jury Instruction No. 12;
In a business such as John Call Engineering, there are
two general types of expenses.
These may be referred to as
variable expenses and fixed expenses.
Variable expenses are those expenses which can be saved
if the contract is not performed.
For example, the contract
provided that John Call would be paid $20 per hour for a
draftsman.
However, suppose the draftsman actually cost John
Call $12 per hour. When the contract was cancelled, John Call
had a chance
to save that $12 because he did not have to hire or
pay for the draftsman. Thus, $12 would be a variable expense.
On the other hand, a fixed expense is an expense which
cannot be saved if the contract is not performed.
For example,
the rent on John Call's office would remain exactly the same
whether or not the Manti contract was cancelled.
In order to determine John Call's lost profits on the
Manti contract, you should follow these steps:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Determine the full amount of money John Call would
have received if Manti City had not breached its
contract.
Subtract the variable expenses as that term has
been explained to you.
Do not subtract fixed expenses, as that term has
been explained to you.
The result of these calculations is referred to
as "lost profits."

In addition, plaintiff

proposed a verdict

form which

would assist the jury in calculating the lost profits.
is attached in the addendum.

A copy

The court refused each of the jury

instructions and the verdict form.

Call's counsel objected that

the court's verdict form allowed the jury to compute lost profits
23

in any which way that they could imagine.

(Tr. p. 307).

Call's

counsel also explained that Jury Instruction No. 8 was necessary
to assist the jury in calculating the gross revenues that Call
would have received.
to the Court
Instruction

(Tr. p. 308). Call's counsel also objected

failing

No.

12.

to use
Call

the

formula

explained

that

set forth in Jury
denying

the

jury

instruction prevented the jury from receiving the information it
needed to rationally calculate Call's lost profits.
The only instructions the Court gave the jury to assist
them in calculating lost profits were Jury Instruction Nos. 15,
16 and 18:
Jury Instruction No. 15:
Because Manti City breached its contract to
plaintiff John Call Engineering, Inc.,
plaintiff John Call is entitled to be awarded
damages in the amount sufficient to place the
plaintiff in as good a financial position as
if the plaintiff had been allowed to perform
the contract and had received payment in full
from Manti City.
Jury Instruction No. 16:
Lost profits may be awarded John Call
Engineering, Inc. if there is evidence from
which the amount of lost profits can be
established.
Evidence include expert
opinions, past financial records, subpoena
of the business owners, the records of a
similar business and the testimony of a
similar business owner.
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Jury Instruction No. 18:
You are instructed evidence of another
experienced and comparable business may be
used by you as evidence
in computing
plaintiff
John Call Engineering, Inc.'s
damages.
The jury came back with a verdict of $13,144.
B. Legal Analysis
The idea of awarding breach of contract damages on the
basis of lost profits, is not a novel nor new concept to the Utah
Courts.

A non-breaching party to a contract [Call] has always

been entitled to an award of damages which would place him in as
good a position as he would have been had the contract been fully
performed.

Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 622 P.2d 800, 803

(Utah 1981);

Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 23 Utah 2d 1, 455

P.2d 197 (Utah 1969) .
To place the non breaching party in as good a position
he would have been, absent the breach of contract, requires a
verdict equal to the lost net profits.

Sawyer v. FMA Leasing,

Co. 722 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986).
In Cook Associates v. Warnick, 664 P.2d

1161-66

(Utah

1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that lost profits could be
established

by

past

earnings, and expert
Supreme

Court

has

earning

records,

evidence

of

testimony of profit potential.

also

set

forth
25

the

formula

subsequent
The Utah

for calculating

lost

profits.

Lost

profits

are

determined

by

computing

the

difference between gross profits and the direct expenses which
would be incurred in earning the profits.. Id.

Acculog Inc. v.

Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984), see, Holman v. Sorenson, 556
P.2d 499 (Utah 1976); Sawyer, supra.

Breach of contract damages

are the contract price less the reasonable costs of completion.
See also, Covington Bros, v. Valley Plastering Inc. 566 P.2d 814
(Nev. 1977).
When the Utah Supreme Court directed the trial court
to determine Call's damages
the

trial

submitted

court

to

(Call, at 1210), the only issue for

determine was

Call's

lost

profits.

Call

jury instructions informing the jury as to the types

of evidence that could be used to determine lost profits, i.e.
expert

testimony,

similar business.

subsequent

earnings,

profits

established

by

Those instructions were given.

However, Call also submitted Jury Instruction Nos . 8,
12 and Amended
profits.
Utah

12 to assist the jury in calculating those lost

Those

Supreme

Court

Warnick,

664 P.2d

692 P.2d

728

773

jury

(Utah

instructions

case
1161

law,

(Utah

i.e.

were
Cook

based

upon

compelling

Associates,

1983); Acculog

Inc.

v.

Inc. v. Peterson,

1984); Sawyer v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d

(Utah 1986); Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499 (Utah 1976);

Penelko v. John Price Associates, 642 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1982).
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The court wholly

failed to tell the jury how lost

profits were to be calculated.

When a Court fails to give a

requested jury instruction, the inquiry to determine whether the
case should be remanded for a new trial, is whether the issues of
fact necessary to be determined and principles of laws applicable
thereto were correctly presented to the jury in a clear and
understandable manner.
P.2d 701 (Utah 1969).

Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366
In this case, they were not.

The jury was

given the facts but they were not given any assistance

by the

Court in applying the law to determine the amount of damages.
The jury did not know how to calculate damages.

They were free

to roam and ignore plaintiff's uncontested evidence and pay heed
to irrelevant and prejudicial arguments.
It is the duty of the Trial Court to instruct the jury
as to the proper measure of damages.
428 P.2d 450 (Ariz. App. 1967).

City of Phoenix v. Wade,

An instruction which says only

that damages can be awarded, is inadequate and requires a new
trial.

Billings Leasing Co. v. Payne, 577 P.2d 386 (Mont. 1978).

Because the trial court did not tell the jury how to
determine Call's lost profits, Call must have a new trial.
C. Conclusion
Breach

of

contract

damages,
27

are

measured

by

lost

profits.

The Utah Supreme Court, in a line of cases cited above,

set forth the types of evidence that can be used to establish
lost profits and the formula to be used in calculating lost
profits.

The trial court instructed the jury as to the types of

evidence that can be used to establish lost profits but failed to
provide

the

calculating

jury

any guidance whatsoever

Call's

lost

profits.

The

to assist
failure

to

them in
properly

instruct the jury reversible error and requires a new trial.
POINT V - THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF
CALL FOR AT LEAST $56,000 OR AWARDED A NEW TRIAL
A. Factual Background
The

first

trial

and

subsequent

appeal

conclusively

established that: 1) Call and Manti entered into an engineering
service contract for engineering services wherein Manti agreed
to compensate Call according to a schedule of hourly rates; 2)
Manti unlawfully

breached

the contract by hiring another en-

gineering firm; and 3) Call was entitled to damages.
As set forth in Part IV of this brief, Call's damages
were Call's lost profits.
At trial, Call established lost profits by:
opinions;

2) past

financial

1) expert

records; 3) the opinion of the

business owner; 4) records of similar businesses; 5) testimony of
a similar business owner; all consistent with the cases cited in
28

Point IV of this brief.
Defendant put on no case whatsoever except for a few
irrelevant questions to David Thurgood, the engineer who replaced
Call.

At the conclusion of all the evidence the court said:
I want to put on the record, though, Mr.
Frischknecht
[Manti's
counsel],
I am
concerned about this that I'd just be blunt
about it, you have no expert testimony at
all in this case and I am a little concerned
because you put the Court into this position.
If you rest and offer no testimony and no
expert position, expert testimony that if it
were appealed, I don't know how the Supreme
Court would treat it. And I don't know how
else to say it, but I'm concerned about it,
to be blunt about it, and I think in fairness
to you I ought to tell you that, that I am
concerned about it and I don't see anything
you can do about it now. But I felt I'd put
it blunt right now so you know what I thought
at this point in the proceedings. I am concerned about it.
The plaintiff has brought
in experts. They put in everything. You've
done nothing but pick them apart and you put
nothing in the affirmative for yourself to
indicate what your experts would do.
What
I'm saying is I think you put this Court in a
very untenable position and if this case is
appealed to the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals, 1 think you put them in an untenable
position and I thought I'd put it on the
record so that depending on what happens it
would be there.

Transcript, p. 315-316.
Judge
whatsoever.

Tibbs

was

correct,

Manti

put

on

no

case

The contradicted and unimpeached evidence showed the

following:
29

1)
provide

In October of 1980, Call contracted with Manti to

for

preparation

engineering
of

services.

preliminary

several alternatives.

report

Phase
and

sewer

one

involved

study

the

suggesting

Subsequent phases dealt with the design,

supervision, installation and other sewer engineering services.
Call v. Manti, at 1205.
2)

The

unambiguous.

terms

in

the

contract

were

clear

and

Call, at 1205.

3)

Pursuant

to

the

agreement,

Manti

agreed

to

compensate Call according to the contract's written fee schedule
and to pay for costs and mileage.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.

The

fee schedule and mileage are set forth in Part IV of this brief.
The contract does not have a ceiling limiting the amount of money
to be paid to Call.
4)
engineering

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.

Plaintiff breached the contract by hiring another
firm,

Call, supra.
Both

David

Thurgood,

who

completed

the

project.

(Tr. p. 90.)
David

Thurgood,

the

replacement

engineer,

and

John Call testified that the rates contained in the Call contract
were reasonable.
Questions

Mr. Thurgood, based upon your experience and
training as a Consulting Engineer, do you have
an opinion as to whether the rates contained on
Table 1 were reasonable back in 1981?

Answer:

They're reasonable.
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(Tr. p. 107.)
Question:

Mr. Call, based upon your experience
and education as a professional
engineer, do you have an opinion as to
whether the rates, contained in your
contract, were reasonable back in
1981, when the contract was entered
into?

Answer:

They were reasonable.

(Tr. p. 166.)
No contrary or impeaching evidence was presented by Manti to
contradict the reasonableness of the fee schedule.
David

Thurgood,

the

replacement

engineer,

then

testified as to the number of hours each employee of Thurgood &
Associates spent to complete the project.
admitted into evidence.

His time records were

(Exhibit 3, Tr. p. 93.)

No one questioned that the hours put into the project
by Mr. Thurgood's firm were reasonable.
had examined Thurgood's time records.

Prior to trial, Call

(Tr. p. 170.)

Mr. Call's

opinion was that the hours expended by Thurgood were reasonable.
(Tr. p. 171.)

He further said that had his firm been allowed to

complete the project, Call would have spent the same hours as
Thurgood & Associates spent on the project.
Answer:

They would be similar.
There's
going to be some variance, but it
wouldn't be significant. . .Three
to four percent.
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(Tr. p. 171.)
There was no contrary testimony as to the number of
hours of engineering services required to complete the contract.
Call then calculated the amount of gross receipts he would have
received had he been allowed to complete the project.
Call's hourly rates times Thurgood's hours.

That is,

The total came to

$377,844.23.
Randy

Peterson, a Certified

called as an expert witness.

Public

Accountant, was

He too calculated the amount that

Call would have received by taking Thurgood's hours and applying
Call's contract rates.

He then added in the costs and mileage

that Call Engineering would have receivcsd and came up with a
total of $386,600.

(Exhibit 38, Tr. p. 150.)

There was no

contrary evidence offered by Manti.
Call then testified as to the amount of expenses he
would have saved by not having to complete the contract.
totalled $185,846.
In

They

(Exhibit 42, Tr. p. 183-193.)

summary,

the

uncontradicted,

and

unimpeached

testimony established the reasonable hours necessary to complete
the contract and the reasonableness of Call's contract rates.
Multiplying

the

contract

hours

by

the

contract

rates

shows

unquestionably that Call would have received at least $377,844.23
in gross receipts.

Call's firm would have saved $185,846 by not
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having

to

$191,988.23.

complete

the

contract.

Call's

damages

were

There was no contrary evidence offered by Manti.

Call also established his lost profits by testimony of
an

expert

witness.

Charles

Peterson

of

Frank

Stuart

&

Associates, an economic consultant, was qualified as an expert
witness and allowed to testify.

(Tr. p. 260-264.)

He testified

that had Call been allowed to complete the contract, Call's lost
profits would have totalled $136,334.
Exhibit 44.)

(Tr. p. 271, plaintiff's

No contrary expert testimony was offered by Manti.

Finally,

to establish

lost

profits, Call

submitted

into evidence his financial records for the years 1981, 1982,
1983, 1984 and 1986.

(Plaintiff's Exhibits 35 and 36.)

was the year that Manti breached

1982

the year of the contract.

Call's financial records for 1985 were not available.

In 1986,

Mr. Call was seriously ill requiring hospitalization and absence
from his business.

Nevertheless, the financial documents showed

that Call's profits margins averaged 11.96 percent.

However, by

eliminating 1982's loss of 18.27, the year that Manti breached
the contract, the average profit margin for the remaining years
averages 18.6 percent.

Taking the gross receipts that Call would

have received of $377,844.23 times the average profit margin of
18.6 percent shows that Call sustained minimum damages of $70,278
as lost profits.
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At the conclusion of all the evidence, Call's counsel
made a motion for directed verdict for $56,377.60.
was

based

on

the

following

figures:

$377,844

The motion

gross

receipts

which Call would have received, minus $22,000 paid to Call, times
Thurgood

& Associates' profit margin rate of

total of $56,377.60.

15 percent for a

The Court admitted that the defendant did

not put on a case but nevertheless denied the motion.
Thereafter,

Call

made

a motion

for

withstanding the verdict and/or a new trial.

a

judgment

not-

Those motions were

denied by the Court also.
B. Legal Analysis
The criteria

for granting

a judgment

the verdict or a directed verdict is the same.
Markets,

19 U.2nd

339, 431 P.2d

566

(1967).

notwithstanding
Koer v. Mayfair
That is whether

reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be determined
from the evidence presented.
Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d
U.2d

68,

unimpeached

513

P.2d

896

(Utah 1982); Anderson v. Gribble, 30

432

evidence

Management Committee v. Graystone

(1973).

shows

that

sustained by Call was $56,377.

Call's
the minimum

than

testimony

that
of

requires

the

a

business

amount

of

and

damages

There is no rational formula for

calculating damages lower than that.
less

uncontroverted

jury

to totally

owner
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To calculate a judgment for

John

disregard:

Call;

2)

the

1) the
expert

testimony of economic consultant Chuck Peterson and C.P.A. Randy
Peterson; 3) the Call contract itself; 4) the testimony of the
replacement engineer, David Thurgood; 5) the financial records of
John

Call

Thurgood.
ignored

Engineering;

and,

6)

the

time

records

of

David

Unfortunately, that is exactly what the jury did.
each

evidence.

and

every

piece

of

plaintiff's

It

uncontroverted

If there was ever a case where reasonable minds could

not differ as to the minimum amount of sustained damages, this
case is it.
Further,

there

minimal verdict
supported

by

was

entered

some

insufficient

evidence

by the jury.

competent

to

justify

the

Each verdict must be

evidence.

Weber

Basin

Water

Conservancy District v. Skeen, 8 U.2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958).
The

criteria

as

to whether

there

is sufficient evidence to

justify the verdict is essentially the same test as to whether a
directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict should
be granted; that is, whether reasonable men could draw different
conclusions from conflicting evidence.

Polleshe v. Transamerica

Insurance Company, 27 U.2d 430, 497 P.2d 236 (1972).

In the

present case, the only evidence that was put in the trial was
plaintiff's case.

There was no conflicting evidence.

It is

impossible for reasonable men to draw different conclusions as to
the minimum

amount of Call's damages.
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It is impossible to

rationally calculate damage at a figure less than $56,377.

It

cannot be done.
New trials are to be awarded when there is insufficient
evidence to justify the verdict or when there have been errors in
law.

In this case both elements are present.

Call is entitled

to a new trial.
POINT VI

-

THE COURT ALLOWED MANTI TO PRESENT IRRELEVANT AND
PREJUDICIAL ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY

A. Factual Background
Prior to the taking of testimony, Call moved to exclude
evidence and argument on the following irrelevant and prejudicial
issues:
1)

Whether

Call

should

be

paid

for

work

not

performed;
2)

Whether the judgment would have to be paid out of
taxpayer's pockets; and

3)

Whether Call should have mitigated his damages.

The Court denied Call's motion but noted that it would sustain
objections to issues 1) and 2 ) .

(Tr. p. 66, 67, 71.)

During the trial, the following prejudicial issues and
arguments were allowed into the trial over Call's objection:
1)

The contract was in dispute.

2)

Call was paid for everything he did. (Tr. p. 81.)
36

(Tr. p. 79-81.)

3)

Call could not proceed without written authority.
(Tr. p. 210-211.)

4)

The taxpayer's would have to pay Call.

(Tr. p.

318. )
B. Legal Analysis
The trial court has the obligation of controlling the
argument and issues presented to the jury.
11 U.2d 411, 360 P.2d 822 (1961).
argue

the

law

as

instructed

instructions to the facts.

Hales v. Peterson,

Counsel is allowed only to

to

the

jury

and

apply

the

Harmon v. Sprouse Reitz, Co., 21 Utah

2d 361, 445 P.2d 773 (Utah 1968).

Counsel may not argue law that

would not be correct jury instructions.

Patton v. Heinkson, 380

P.2d 916 (Nev. 1963); Zelman v. Stauder, 468 P.2d 943 (Ariz. App.
1978); Williamson v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 487 P.2d 110 (Or.
App. 1971).
Manti's argument that the contract was in dispute and
that Call needed written authorization is contrary to the Utah
Supreme Court's ruling in the first appeal of this case.
Manti's
Call's

judgment

argument
was

that

designed

taxpayers

to elicit

would

sympathy,

passion and cannot be sanctioned by any court.
Willis, 17 Utah 2d 314, 410 P.2d 1003 (Utah 1966).
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have

to pay

appeal to

c.f. Eager v.

Arguments referring to how a judgment can be paid are
clearly improper.
C. Conclusion
Manti injected improper and prejudicial arguments and
issues into the proceedings requiring a new trial.
POINT VII

-

CALL SHOULD

BE AWARDED

HIS EXPERT WITNESS FEE

COSTS
A. Factual Background
The

jury

awarded

Call

a

judgment

for

$13,440.

Thereafter, Call filed a memorandum of cost totalling $11,092-71.
Of

the

$11,092.71

requested,

$9,812.54 was

witness fees incurred in the two trials.

spent

for expert

Call submits that the

costs were necessarily incurred in good faith and were essential
to the development of Call's case.

For these reasons, Call

should be awarded his costs incurred.'
At trial, Call sought lost profits caused by Manti's
breach of an engineering service contract.

Lost profits may be

proven by: 1) expert opinion; 2) testimony of the business owner;
3) records of a similar business; 4) testimony of a similar
business owner; 5) past financial records.
Call showed lost profits by comparing the records and
contract of the engineering firm (Thurgood) that completed the
sewer project with the Call contract rates.
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Because the Thurgood

contract and Call contract differed on their hourly rates, Call
needed a witness who could correlate the hourly rates that Call
would have received on his contract with the engineering work
actually performed on the sewer contract.
Peterson.

The witness was Randy

Randy Peterson compared the contracts, established the

hourly rates and made the mathematical computations.

For these

reasons, the costs incurred for Randy Peterson were reasonable
and necessary to Call's case.
In addition, Call showed lost profits through expert
testimony.

Lost profits equals anticipated gross receipts, less

anticipated expenses to perform the contract.
expenses are deducted from gross receipts.

However, not all

Fixed expenses which

do not decrease with non-performance, are not deducted from the
expected gross receipts.

Call called Frank Stuart & Associates

to identify and explain to the court and the jury those expenses
that would be saved by Call not having to perform the contract,
and those expenses which would still be incurred whether or not
Call performed the contract.

The testimony of Frank Stuart &

Associates was not only necessary, it was crucial to Call's case.
Without the testimony, Call could not establish a net profit
figure to submit to the jury.
B. Legal Analysis
Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-4 provides that witnesses legally
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required or in good faith requested to attend a District Court
shall be paid $14 per day plus $.30 per mile for travel-

This

section, however, does not place a limit upon what an expert
witness can be paid.

Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-8 provides "the fees

of a witness paid in a civil cause may be taxed against the
losing party".

Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-8 does not place a limit

upon the amount of fees that can be paid an expert or that may be
taxed to the other party.

However, traditionally the Utah Courts

held "that expert witnesses cannot be awarded extra compensation
unless the statute expressly so provides".

Frampton v. Wilson,

605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980).
In

contrast,

in

the

more

recent

case

of

Highland

Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Corp., 683 P.2d 1042
(Utah
$2,300

1984),

the Utah

incurred

witnesses.

for

Supreme court
deposing

awarded

witnesses

costs

exceeding

including

expert

The court justified the award on the basis that the

complexity of the contract case, and the* theories of recovery
sought, required

the expenditure.

Highland,

at

1051, 1052.

Similarly, in the present case, the complexity of the contract
case and the theories of recovery, required expert testimony.
It makes no sense to award expert witness deposition testimony
costs and not expert witness trial testimony costs.
In Utah, costs are closely examined for "the purpose
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of guarding against abuse by those better financially equipped,
lest the costs of seeking justice become prohibitive for the
financially

ill

equipped".

Highland,

at

1051.

Unless,

plaintiffs, such as Call, are awarded their expert witness fee
costs, the costs of seeking justice becomes prohibitive.
example

For

in the present case, Call was awarded a judgment of

$13,440.00 plus pre-judgment interest $6,832.00, but if attorneys
fees

(1/3

subtracted

of

the

from

recovery)

the

and

judgment,

costs
Call

incurred

receives

are
only

both
about

$2,391.00. Seeking justice for Call and others like him becomes
prohibitive in any complex contract case.

The rights of Call as

guaranteed by Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution
become meaningless.

Section 11 states:

All Courts shall be open and every person
for an injury done to him in his person,
property, or reputation shall have remedy by
due course of law which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this state
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to
which he is a party.
If Call is not awarded the costs for the expert witness
fees, he is not provided a remedy for the breach of contract
created by Manti.

For these reasons and others, many states,

award costs of expert witness fees either by statute or rule.
e.g. ,

Kaps v* Transport, Inc. v. Henry, 572 P.2d 72 (Alaska
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1977) (rule); R. T, Nahas Co. v. Hulet, 674 P.2d 1036 (Idaho App.
1983) (rule); American Timber & Trading Co. v. Niedermeyer, 558
P.2d 1211 (Or. 1976) (statute); Blasdel v. Montana Power Co., 640
P.2d 889 (Mont. 1982) (statute); Mays v. Todaro, 626 P.2d 260
(Nev. 1981) (statute); Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 (Wyo.
1986) (statute).

Call should be awarded costs for expert witness

fees incurred.
XI.
CONCLUSION
After

the

Supreme

Court

decision

in

John

Call

Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp, 743 P.2d 1205 (1987), Call
was entitled to have a trial solely to determine the amount of
lost profits sustained by Call as a result of Manti's breach of
the engineering services contract.
On

remand,

the

trial

court

allowed

irrelevant

prejudicial issues to contaminate the second trial.

and

Further,

the trial court refused to instruct the jury as to how lost
profits are calculated.
Further, Call was entitled to a directed verdict or a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in a sum of not less than
$56,377.00.

42

For these reasons, the Court should amend the judgment
to $56,377 or remand the case for a new trial on the issues of
damages.
DATED this

day of February, 1990.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff\Appellant

By:
DALE F. GARDINER
ROBERT J. DEBRY
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ADDENDUM

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party.

1896

Art. I § 11
Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN CALL ENGINEERING, INC., ;
a Utah corporation,
SPECIAL VERDICT
Plaintiff,
vs.
MANTI CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation,

)

Civil No. 8606

i
'

JUDGE DON V. TIBBS

Defendant.

What amount of Gross Profits
of money do you find that the
plaintiff John Call Engineering Inc. would have earned if
it had been allowed to fully
complete the Engineering Services Contract?

$

What amount of expenses did
John Call Engineering Inc.
save by not having to fully
complete the Engineering Services Contract with Manti
City?

$

Rule 8

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions,
Rules, and Orders § 1 et seq., 61A Am. Jur. 2d
Pleading §§ 1 et seq., 238.
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 1
et seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 63 to 210, 140 et
seq., 211 et seq.
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment
as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8
A.L.R.3d 1361.

Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action
as affected by opponent's motion for summary
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or direeled verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.
Key Numbers. — Motions «=» 1 et seq.;
Pleading «• 38V2 to 186, 187 et seq.

Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim,
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of
the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a
part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the
obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant,
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as
denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No
technical forms of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alter22
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Rule 8

native and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially the same as Rule 8, F R C.P.
Cross-References. — Amended and supplemental pleadings, Rule 15
Arbitration, § 78-3la-1 et seq.
Comparative negligence, § 78-27-38.
Counterclaim and cross-claim, Rule 13.
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1
et seq
Defenses and objections, Rule 12.
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim,
§§ 78-3-16 5, 78-4-24, 78-6-14, Appx G, Code
of Judicial Administration.
Fellow servant defined, § 34-25-2.
Form of pleadings, Rule 10.
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and
brevity of statement, Rule 84.
Forms of answers, Forms 21, 22.
Hearing of certain defenses before trial, Rule
12(d).

Interpleader, Rule 22.
Motions, forms for, Forms 20, 23 to 24.
Numbered paragraphs, Rule 10(b)
One form of action, Rule 2.
Reply to answer, order for, Rule 7(a).
Security
interest,
enforceability
of,
§ 70A-9-203.
Special forms of pleadings and writs abolished, Rule 65B(a).
Statute of frauds, generally, § 25-5-1 et seq.
Statute of frauds, investment securities,
§ 70A-8-319.
Statute of frauds, sales, § 70A-2-201.
Statute of frauds, Uniform Commercial
Code, personal property not otherwise covered,
§ 70A-1-206.
Third-party practice, Rule 14.
Time for answer, Rules 3(b), 12(a).
Uniform Commercial Code, supplementary
principles of law applicable, § 70A-1-103.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affirmative defenses
—Accord and satisfaction.
Pleading
Time limitation
—Consent
—Election of remedies
—Estoppel
Failure to plead
—Failure of consideration
Failure to plead
——Pleading
—Failure to plead.
Affidavit opposing summary judgment.
Denial
Notice and opportunity
Waiver of defense.
—Fraud
Necessary allegations
—Mitigation of damages
Failure to plead
Pleading
—Mutual mistake
—Statute of frauds
Motion to dismiss
Pleading

—Statute of limitations.
Applicability to plaintiffs.
Pleading.
—-—Waiver
—Waiver
Claims for relief
—Amendment of pleading.
—Attorney fees
—Essential allegations.
Alienation of affections
—Request for alternative relief
—Sufficiency of complaint
Attachment of exhibit
Found not sufficient.
Found sufficient
Liberal construction.
Consistency
—Double recovery.
—Election between claims
—Election of remedies under contract.
—Res judicata
—Separate claims
Contract and quantum meruit
Defenses
—Lack of consideration.
Purpose of rules
Cited

23
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Rule 15

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 59 Am Jur 2d Parties
LS8 et seq
2.J.S. — 67 C J S Parties §§ 72 to 84
A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution

or indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20
A L R 4 t h 338
Key Numbers. — Parties «=» 49 to 56

Kule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires A party shall plead m response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated m all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment, but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted m the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective m its statement of a claim for relief or defense If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall
so order, specifying the time therefor
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially identical to Rule 15, F R C P
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Rule 15

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Amendments.
—Afler pretrial order.
—Alternative to dismissal.
Payment of attorney fees.
Prolix complaint.
—Amendment of response.
—Answer.
To include counterclaim.
—Complaint.
To defeat motion for summary judgment.
To include damages.
—Considerations.
Prejudice.
—Court's discretion.
——Abused.
Not abused.
—Dismissal without opportunity to amend.
—Following dismissal.
—Late amendment.
Day of trial.
-—Durjng or after trial.
—Reply amounting to amendment.
Amendment to conform to evidence.
—Allowed.
—Alternative to dismissal.
—Amendment unnecessary.
Consent to try issue.
-Evidence supporting findings.
Issue raised by complaint.
—Consent to try issue.
Not found.
—Construction of rule.
—Defense not pleaded.
Affirmative defense.
Issue tried by parties.
—Failure to object to evidence.
—Issues not pleaded.
Mutual mistake.
—New cause of action.
Child support.
—New theory of recovery.
—Not allowed.
—Notice.
—Prejudice.
—Restriction to matter pleaded or tried.
• Relation back of amendments.
—Adding or substituting parties.
—Statute of limitations.
—Untimely service of orginal complaint.
Supplemental pleadings.
—Answers.
Allowed.
Not allowed.
Cited.
Amendments.
—After pretrial order.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defendant to amend his answer to in-

elude as a defense an issue that had been specifically excluded as a trial issue by a pretrial
order, where the amendment was made long
before trial, the opposing party had adequate
opportunity to meet the additonal issue raised,
and neither party was placed in a position of
any greater advantage or disadvantage or prejudice by virtue of the amendment to the pleading. Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94 (Utah
1981).
—Alternative to dismissal.
Payment of attorney fees.
Where, as a condition to filing their fourth
amended complaint, appellants agreed to pay a
$150 attorney fee, it was neither coercive nor
unfair to them and is not a ground for reversal
regardless of whether or not the payment of
such attorney's fees are authorized by the
Rules. The alternative was to dismiss, and in
granting a dismissal without prejudice the
court could stay any new action that might be
commenced until costs of the action that had
been dismissed including attorney's fees had
been paid. The appellants invited the court to
impose such conditions in order to avoid a dismissal and the necessity of starting over again.
Tebbs & Tebbs v. Oliveto, 123 Utah 158, 256
P.2d 699 (1953).
Prolix complaint
Where complaint was prolix rather than being a short, concise statement of a claim as
contemplated by Rules 8(a) and 8(e)(1), it was
reasonable to permit plantiff to redraft pleadings rather than dismiss the action without
prejudice. McGavin v. Preferred Ins. Exch., 7
Utah 2d 161, 320 P.2d 1109 (1958).
—Amendment of response.
Whether a motion to amend a response to an
amended complaint should be allowed more
than ten days after the amended complaint
was filed lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court. Wasescha v. Terra, Inc., 528 P.2d
802 (Utah 1974).
—Answer.
To include counterclaim.
In personal injury action in which defendant's insurer was furnishing lawyer to defend
insured and lawyer had not met defendant
until just before taking his deposition and
therefore did not know that defendant had injuries and believed plaintiff to have been at
fault, refusal to allow amendment of answer to
include counterclaim was an abuse of discretion since case was one where "justice requires" amendment. Gillman v. Hansen, 26
Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971).
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Rule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves
for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may
offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having
reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not
been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a
waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed
verdict is effective without any assent of the jury.
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for
any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party,
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict
was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial.
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion.
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided
for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on
the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be
granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the
motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon
does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally
denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in
accordance with the order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate
court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment,
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nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a
new trial shall be granted
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical
to Rule 50, F R C P
NOTES TO DECISIONS
peal on the basis that the evidence does not
support the judgment, an exception exists
where plain error appears in the record and
would result in a miscarriage of justice Henderson v Meyer, 533 P 2d 290 (Utah 1975)

ANALYSIS

Directed verdict
—In general
—Appeal
After failure to seek directed verdict
—Directed verdict nunc pro tunc
—Evidence
—Findings and conclusions not required
—Instruction for directed verdict
Judgment not vuhstanding verdict
—Appeal
—Construction
—Evidence
—Motion foreclosed
—Ruling on reserved motion
—Splitting of negligence and damages issues
Cited

—Directed verdict nunc pro tunc.
Where court inadvertently ordered entry of
judgment rather than a directed verdict, and
through oversight the jury was discharged
without signing a verdict, the court could properly vacate the judgment, and order a directed
verdict nunc pro tunc Finlayson v Brady, 121
Utah 204, 240 P 2d 491 (1952)

Directed verdict
—In general.
In reality, ordering a directed verdict is an
act of the court, the signing and entry thereof
being formalities paying tribute to the history
of the practice Finlayson v Brady, 121 Utah
204, 240 P2d 491 (1952)
A directed verdict is only appropriate when
the court is able to conclude, as a matter of
law, that reasonable minds would not differ on
the facts to be determined from the evidence
presented Management Comm v Graystone
Pines, Inc, 652 P 2d 896 (Utah 1982) ~
—Appeal.
Supreme Court s standard of review of a directed verdict is the same as that imposed upon
the trial court the evidence must be examined
in the light most favorable to the losing party,
and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor of
the losing partv, the directed verdict cannot be
sustained Management Comm v Graystone
Pines Inc , 652 P 2d 896 (Utah 1982)
The Supreme Court will sustain the granting of a motion for a directed verdict onl\ if the
evidence was such that reasonable men could
not arrive at a different conclusion Anderson
v Gnbble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P 2d 432 (1973)
After failure to seek directed verdict
Although party who does not move for directed verdict generally has no standing to ap-

—Evidence.
In directing a verdict, the court must examine the evidence in a light most favorable to
the party against whom the verdict is intended, and it is not its province to weigh or
determine the preponderance of the evidence
Finlavson v Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P 2d
491 (1952)
In deciding a motion for a directed verdict,
the court must consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the party against whom
the motion is directed and must resolve every
controverted fact in his favor Boskovich v
Utah Constr Co , 123 Utah 387, 259 P 2d 885
(1953)
A directed verdict pursuant to Subdivision
(a) upon the ground that the evidencs fails to
show that defendant is negligent, is tantamount to granting a motion for a non suit and
on appeal must be reversed if the evidence is
such that reasonable men could arrive at a dif
ferent conclusion Rhiness v Dansie, 24 Utah
2d 375, 472 P 2d 428 (1970)
Mere fact defendant's horses escaped from
inclosure was not sufficient, under § 41-6 38
to justify submitting defendants negligence tc
jurv in action by motorist whose vehicle struck
a horse, and thus directed verdict for defendant
was proper Rhiness v Dansie, 24 Utah 2d 375
472 P2d 428 (1970)
In suit by w lfe for her personal injuries anc
husband s wTongful death in collision, wife'1
claim for injuries should have been submittec
to jury since there was no evidence to establish
any basis to impute alleged negligence of hus
band-driver to wife, wrongful death claim alsc
presented question for jury since there wen
fact issues as to whether defendant s trucl
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ment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfaction and discharge operated to satisfy and discharge everything merged in and adjudicated
^y t n e Judgment. Sierra Nev Mill Co. v Keith
O'Brien Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943.

.
Dutv
Attachment
'
Acceptance of full payment
Owner or attorney.
^-Vacation of satisfaction.
Hearing.
Court
Effect#

Q

Qr

atto

*
—Vacation of satisfaction.

IJuty.
Attachment
Court had duty to make order directing partial satisfacton of judgment to extent of money
collected through attachment proceeding.
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110, 86 P. 805.
Effect
—Acceptance of full payment

Hearing.
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed
kv judgment creditor cannot be vacated without action and hearing in equity, and the hen
0 f an attorney against the proceeds of the judgm e n t does not include his personal right to exec u t e against the judgment debtor. Utah C V.
Fe±
C r e d l t U m o n v je n k l ns, 528 P 2d 1187
(Utah 1974).

When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full payCOLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 979 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S Judgments §§ 574 to 584.
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of

judgment against one joint tort-feasor as release of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 891 to 899.

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment,
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery', such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
173

Rule 59

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shal]
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F R C P
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
for new trial, § 21-2-2.
Harmless error not ground for new trial,
Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Abandonment of motion
Accident or surprise.
Arbitration awards.
Caption on motion for new trial
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict.
Correction of record
Costs

Decision against law
Discretion of tnal court
Effect of order granting new trial.
Effect of untimely motion.
Evidence.
—Sufficiency
Excessive or inadequate damages
Failure to object to findings of fact
Filing of affidavits
Incompetence or negligence of counsel
Misconduct of jury
Motion to alter or amend judgment
Motion to be presented to trial court
Newly discovered evidence
New trial on initiative of court.
Particulanzation of grounds for motion for new
tnal
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial.
Reconsideration of motion for new trial.
Settlement bars appeal.
Summary judgment

Time for motion.
Tolling time for appeal.
Waiver.
Cited.
Abandonment of motion.
Abandonment of motion for new trial must
be intentional, and the facts must indicate this
intention Bailev v Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P 2d
1043 (Utah 1984)
Accident or surprise.
A "surprise" at trial which could have been
easily guarded against by utilization of available discovery procedures may not serve as a
ground for a new trial under Subdivison (a)(3)
Anderson v Bradley, 590 P 2d 339 (Utah
1979)
Failure to interpose a timely objection to testimony challenged on the ground of surprise
would be a sufficient reason to deny a motion
for a new tnal on that ground Chournos v
D'Agnillo, 642 P 2d 710 (Utah 1982)
Plaintiff was not entitled to a new tnal on
the basis of surprise concerning testimony of
the defendant's expert witness where the
plaintiff failed to object to the testimony either
before, or immediately after, it was given
Jensen v Thomas, 570 P 2d 695 (Utah 1977)
Claim of error based on accident or surprise,
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